Introduction
Over the last two or three decades, a great range of different assumptions about the measurability and interpersonal comparability of welfare have been analysed with regard to their potential for providing escape-routes from Arrow's famous impossibility theorem (see, amongst many others, Sen 1970 Sen /1979 Sen , 1982 Roberts, 1980; d'Aspremont, 1985) . In this context, Roberts (1980) and particularly Blackorby & Donaldson (1982) have investigated the implications of ratio-scale measurability with full interpersonal comparability, an informational framework that attaches interpersonal significance to a 'zero-line' of welfare as well as enabling interpersonal comparisons of welfare levels and units.
Ratio-scale measurability with full interpersonal comparability can be seen as a rich informational framework which attaches interpersonal significance to a 'zero-line' of welfare.
The present note is concerned with an extremely narrow informational assumption that still admits the measurability of a 'zero-line': namely, the assumption that welfare is only ordinally measurable, that neither welfare levels nor welfare units are interpersonally comparable, but that a 'zero-line' of welfare is interpersonally significant. This framework will be called (ONC+0) and defined formally below.
The idea of introducing a 'zero-line' of welfare whilst disallowing other kinds of interpersonal comparisons has been studied much less extensively than richer informational assumptions.
However, there are some notable exceptions. In a paper on distributionally sensitive costbenefit analysis, Blackorby and Donaldson (1987) have proposed a method of social evaluation on the basis of 'welfare ratios' defined in terms of the ratio of household income to a suitable poverty line, requiring no interpersonal comparisons except those provided by the relevant poverty lines. Tsui & Weymark (1997) , Naumova (1998) and Yanovskaya (1998) all address the informational framework of ratio-scale measurability without interpersonal comparability of welfare levels or units, an informational framework that is still less narrow than the one discussed in the present note. Gibbard, Hylland and Weymark (1987) have explored the implications of introducing a fixed feasible alternative for Arrow's theorem.
While the welfare-level generated by this fixed alternative could in principle be interpreted as the 'zero-line' or 'norm-line', such an interpretation would require us to make two contestable assumptions: first, the assumption that there always exists a fixed alternative generating a 'zero' or 'norm' level of welfare, and, second, the assumption that the fixed alternative generating this welfare-level is the same for all individuals and profiles. The present approach, on the other hand, requires no such assumptions. Tungodden (1998) , finally, has proposed the idea of introducing 'independent norm levels' within an ordinalist framework by partitioning the set of persons into two or more subsets and assuming interpersonal comparability of welfare levels between members of different subsets, but not between members of the same subset. In this framework, Tungodden explores 'head count' social choice rules paralleling the ones discussed in the context of theorem 3.1. below.
Some of the results to be stated below (in particular theorems 3.1. and 3.3.) can be interpreted and alternatively proved as implications of Gibbard, Hylland, & Weymark's results (1987) or as implications of Tungodden's results (1998) ; in the former case, by adding a new "auxiliary element" to the set of alternatives, to be interpreted as a fixed feasible alternative, and identifying the 'zero-line' with each person's welfare-level under that new alternative; and in the latter case, by partitioning the set of persons into (at most) two subsets.
Before we can explore the escape-routes from Arrow's theorem provided by the assumption of (ONC+0) (section 3.), it will be requisite to survey Arrow's theorem and some related results (section 2.), as these results will serve as a 'reference frame' not only for assessing the results concerning (ONC+0), but also for proving some of them.
Arrow's Theorem and Related Results
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of persons and X a set of alternative social states (n≥2, and |X|≥3). Following Sen's social-choice-theoretic formalism (Sen, 1970 (Sen, /1979 (Sen, , 1982 THEOREM 2.1. (Arrow, 1951 /1963 , Sen 1970 /1979 
In section 3., we shall see that theorems 2.1. and 2.3. are logically dependent upon the absence of an interpersonally significant 'zero-line' of welfare, for, if we introduce such a 'zero-line' by adopting (ONC+0), the class of SWFLs satisfying (U), (P) and (I) is not restricted to dictatorial rules.
It is well known that, if we relax the requirement that the ordering R generated by a SWFL be transitive and demand only that R be quasi-transitive --i.e. P must be transitive, but I need not --, Arrow's original impossibility result can be circumvented even under the assumption of (ONC):
THEOREM 2.4. There exist SWFLs generating quasi-transitive social orderings which satisfy (ONC), (U), (P), (I) and (D).
Proof. The following SWFL satisfies the required properties: for each {W i }, define F({W i })
to be the ordering R such that, for all x 1 , x 2 ∈X, x 1 Rx 2 if and only if it is not the case that
However, the possibility result of theorem 2.4. is not very robust: it is also well known that any SWFL generating quasi-transitive social orderings which satisfies Arrow's conditions must violate the following two conditions:
NON-OLIGARCHY (O)
. F must not be oligarchic: there must not exist an M⊆N such that, for all {W i } in the domain of F and any x 1 , x 2 ∈X, (i) x 1 Rx 2 whenever W i (x 1 )>W i (x 2 ) for some i∈M, and (ii) x 1 Px 2 whenever W i (x 1 )>W i (x 2 ) for all i∈M, where R = F({W i }).
POSITIVE RESPONSIVENESS (PR).
Let {W i } and {W* i } be any profiles in the domain of F, x 1, x 2 ∈X, and j∈N such that, for all i∈N, with i≠j, W i = W* i , and either [W j (x 1 )<W j (x 2 ) and
THEOREM 2.5. (Sen, 1982, p. 167 If we once again strengthen the Pareto condition, a lexicographic extention of an oligarchy emerges:
THEOREM 2.7. (Guha, 1972) Suppose F is a SWFL generating quasi-transitive social orderings which satisfies (ONC), (U), (SP) and (I). Then F is a lexicographic oligarchy, i.e. N can be partitioned into S 1 , S 2 , ..., S k (for some k) such that, for any {W i }∈W n and any x 1 ,
xPy if and only if x 1 P S i ({W i })x 2 for some i∈{1, 2, ..., k}
where R = F({W i }).
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As shown in section 3., theorems 2.5., 2.6. and 2.7. are also logically dependent upon the absence of an interpersonally significant 'zero-line' of welfare: in the informational framework of (ONC+0), the class of SWFLs generating quasi-transitive social orderings which satisfy (U), (P) and (I) is not restricted to oligarchic rules, and, in this class, only those rules which satisfy the condition of anonymity (to be defined below) in addition to (D) violate (PR).
Introducing a 'Zero-Line' of Welfare
The present informational framework can be defined as follows. A transformation φ on (a subset of) the real numbers is sign-preserving if, for all t in the domain of φ, sign(φ(t)) = sign(t), where, for each t∈R, To operationalize (ONC+0), one could, conceivably, identify, for each person i (or household), a bundle of goods, or a bundle of basic functionings, y(i), which are (judged to be) so fundamental to person i's well-being that their lack would (be judged to) imply impoverished living conditions for person i. Let us call this bundle of goods or functionings, (Blackorby & Donaldson, 1987) . The bundle y(i) could, for instance, include a certain minimal standard of nutrition, shelter, health care provision, education, and so on. One could then define, for each person i, the welfare-level generated by y(i) to be equal to 0 and thus obtain, by stipulation, an interpersonally significant 'zero-line', i.e.
ORDINAL MEASURABILITY, MEASURABILITY OF A 'ZERO-LINE', NO INTERPERSONAL COMPARABILITY OF WELFARE LEVELS OR UNITS (ONC+0). For any {W
(this is a version of a proposal by Blackorby & Donaldson, 1987 ; for a discussion of the concept of functionings, see, for example, Sen, 1992 Sen, 1982, part V; Sen, 1997) , but they should here be viewed from the perspective of trying to identify a narrow informational framework for social choice.
Although we use the concept of a 'zero-line' in this note, in essence none of the present results depends upon identifying the distinguished 'norm-line' with 0, and the results of the present note can be generalized to accommodate a special case of Tungodden's idea of 'independent norm levels' (Tungodden, 1998) , namely the idea of a single 'norm-line'. It should become obvious that, with minor adjustments in the following theorems and proofs, (ONC+0) could be replaced with the new condition (ONC+a) for a fixed a∈R:
ORDINAL MEASURABILITY, MEASURABILITY OF A 'NORM-LINE', NO INTERPERSONAL COMPARABILITY OF WELFARE LEVELS OR UNITS (ONC+a). For any {W i } and {W*
, where {φ i } is some n-tuple of positive monotonic transformations such that, for each i and all t, t<a implies φ i (t)<a, t=a implies φ i (t)=a, and t>a implies φ i (t)>a.
It is even conceivable that different 'norm-lines' are assigned to different persons and that, formally, for each person i, a person-specific a i ∈R is substituted for the fixed a∈R in the definition of (ONC+a). But, whilst (ONC+0) and (ONC+a) are fully compatible with the condition of anonymity, to be defined below, it would be harder to reconcile the introduction of person-specific 'norm-lines' with this condition.
For reasons of mathematical simplicity, however, we shall use (ONC+0) throughout the present note.
We first observe that (ONC+0) is sufficient for circumventing the original Arrowian impossibility result (theorem 2.1.):
THEOREM 3.1. There exist SWFLs satisfying (ONC+0), (U), (P), (I) and (D).
To prove this result, define, for each {W i } and each x∈X, N
, interpreted as the number of people whose welfare level is, respectively, above, on, and below the fixed 'zero-line'. Now different versions of the 'head-count' rule, often used for the measurement of poverty (for discussion, see Sen, 1982, part V) , supplemented with suitable tie-breaking rules can be seen to satisfy all of Arrow's conditions in the new informational framework:
Proof. Consider the following SWFL: for each {W i }, let F({W i }) be the ordering R such that, for all x 1 , x 2 ∈X,
and
where σ is a fixed permutation of N.
({W i (.)}) and the rankings of the tie-breaking lexicographic dictatorship are all invariant under the admissible transformations of (ONC+0), F satisfies (ONC+0). It is also easily seen that F generates transitive social orderings and that it satisfies (U), (P) (in fact, it satisfies (SP)) and (I). Here we confine ourselves to showing that F is not dictatorial. Assume, for a contradiction, that person k is a dictator. By (U), we may consider {W i } and
and, for all i≠k, W i (x 1 )<0<W i (x 2 ). Let R = F({W i }). Since k is the dictator, we have x 1 Px 2 . But
Informally, F is the following rule: first minimize the number of people whose welfare-level is below the 'zero-line'; if there are ties, minimize the number of people whose welfare-level is on the 'zero-line'; if there are still ties, install a lexicographic dictatorship to break these ties.
We have a considerable degree of freedom in designing a version of the 'head-count' rule satisfying the conditions of theorem 3.1.. Depending on how frequently a person's welfarelevel lies exactly on the 'zero-line', the above defined SWFL differs from the SWFL that maximizes, firstly, the number of people whose welfare-level is above the 'zero-line' and, secondly, the number of people whose welfare-level is on the 'zero-line', before finally using a lexicographic dictatorship for breaking ties. But we have a more substantial degree of freedom in specifying how a lexicographic dictatorship for breaking ties should be installed.
In the SWFL defined above, this tie-breaking lexicographic dictatorship, formally represented by the permutation σ, is completely fixed. However, given the informational resources of (ONC+0), it is also possible to make the the-breaking lexicographic dictatorship dependent upon the number of people below, on, or above the 'zero-line'; it is, for example, perfectly compatible with the conditions of theorem 3.1. to define a different σ m for each
An easy example shows that, unfortunately, one of the most attractive ideas on how the tiebreaking lexicographic dictatorship could be made sensitive to the pattern of persons below, on, or above the 'zero-line' does not work. If two alternatives x 1 and x 2 tie with respect to the 'head-count' criterion, it may seem desirable to break this tie by giving lexicographic priority to the welfare of those persons whose welfare levels are below the 'zero-line' under both x 1 and x 2 . However, such a rule will sometimes produce cyclical social orderings: Consider the following profile for N = {1, 2, 3} and X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 }.
Clearly, each pair of alternatives in X ties with respect to the 'head-count' criterion. Now suppose that we define a tie-breaking rule which, for a given pair of tied alternatives, gives lexicographic priority to the welfare of those persons whose welfare-level is below the 'zeroline' under both of these alternatives. In the present example, there exists a unique person of this description for each pair of alternatives. Thus we must have x 1 Px 2 (tie broken by person 3), x 2 Px 3 (tie broken by person 1) and x 3 Px 1 (tie broken by person 2), a cycle.
Is some type of lexicographic dictatorship the only way of breaking ties? The following classification theorem provides an answer to this question with respect to an important class of ties. 
THEOREM 3.2. Suppose F satisfies (ONC+0), (U), (I) and (SP
Proof. Suppose F satisfies (ONC+0), (U), (I) and (SP). Let (δ 1 , δ 2 , ..., δ n )∈{-1, 0, 1} n be given.
In step (1), we will use F to construct a SWFL, G : W m → set of transitive social orderings, that satisfies the conditions of theorem 2.3.. In step (2), theorem 2.3. will then enable us to determine the structure of G; and in step (3), we will infer the structure of F from the structure of G. 
whence W* i (x 1 )>W* i (x 2 ), and hence x 1 Px 2 ; and so G satisfies (SP) too.
We shall now prove that G satisfies (ONC). But, for each i,
where {V* i }∈W n is the profile corresponding to
(2) Since G satisfies all the conditions of theorem 2.3., there exists a permutation σ of {1, 2, ..., m} such that, for any {W i }∈W m and any x 1 , x 2 ∈X, x 1 Px 2 if and only if W σ(i) (x 1 ) > W σ(i) (x 2 ) for some i∈{1, 2, ..., m} and W σ(j) (x 1 ) = W σ(j) (x 2 ) for all j<i,
(3) Define a permutation π of N as follows: for each j∈N,
We will now show that, for any {W i }∈W n and any x 1 , x 2 ∈X such that, for each i, sign(W i (x 1 )) = sign(W i (x 2 )) = δ i ,
Given any {W i }∈W n and any
and, for all y≠x 1 ,
Now define {V i }∈W m as follows: for each j,
and G({V i }) = F({W' i }) = R'. But, by (2), we know that
and, by the definition of {V i } and π, this holds if and only if W' π(i) (x 1 ) > W' π(i) (x 2 ) for some i∈{1, 2, ..., m}
But since W' π(j) (x 1 ) = 0 = W' π(j) (x 2 ) for all j>m, this holds if and only if W' π(i) (x 1 ) > W' π(i) (x 2 ) for some i∈N and W' π(j) (x 1 ) = W' π(j) (x 2 ) for all j<i, and, finally, since, for all i, W' i (x 1 ) = W i (x 1 ) and W' i (x 2 ) = W i (x 2 ), the desired result follows.
Q.E.D.
Given a SWFL satisfying (ONC+0), (U), (SP) and (I), theorem 3.2. states that whenever the same persons are above, on, and below the 'zero-line' under both x 1 and x 2 --formally sign(W i (x 1 )) = sign(W i (x 2 ))= δ i for all i∈N and a fixed (δ 1 , δ 2 , ..., δ n )∈{-1, 0, 1} n --the relative ranking of x 1 and x 2 is determined by a lexicographic dictatorship; if we use (P) instead of (SP), small modifications in the proof of theorem 3.2. are sufficient to establish that a dictatorship as defined in condition (D) must determine the relative ranking of x 1 and x 2 .
Given this classification result, it is also easy to see that our possibility result under (ONC+0) is rather limited. As soon as we replace the condition of non-dictatorship with the slightly stronger, but --arguably --equally plausible, condition of anonymity, an impossibility result reappears.
ANONYMITY (A).
For any {W i } in the domain of F and any permutation σ of N, F(
THEOREM 3.3. There exist no SWFLs satisfying (ONC+0), (U), (P), (I) and (A).
Proof. Assume, for a contradiction, that F is a SWFL which satisfies (ONC+0), (U), (P), (I) and (A). We will construct a SWFL which satisfies the conditions of theorem 2.1..
Let (δ 1 , δ 2 , ..., δ n ) = (1, 1, ..., 1), and define a corresponding SWFL, G : W m → set of transitive social orderings, as in the proof of theorem 3.2. (note that, for the present definition of the δ i , m = n). As before, G satisfies (ONC), (U), (I) and --with small modifications in the previous proof --(P). We shall now show that G also satisfies (A). Let σ be any permutation of N. Then
But since G satisfies (A), it also satisfies (D), whence G satisfies (ONC), (U), (P), (I) and (D).
This contradicts theorem 2.1.. Q.E.D.
In analogy to theorems 2.4. to 2.7., we will now explore the consequences of moving from transitivity to quasi-transitivity and ask how robust the impossibility result of theorem 3.3. is with regard to a relaxation of the requirement that the social orderings generated by a SWFL be transitive. Theorem 3.3. itself fails to persist. 
Q.E.D.
Moreover, it is easily seen that condition (O), which was sufficient to reinstate an impossibility result under (ONC), does not rule out the SWFL defined in the proof of comes to breaking ties, every member of N has a veto --we will return to this issue in proposition 3.6.).
In analogy to theorem 3.2., we will now show that, for an important class of ties, any SWFL generating quasi-transitive social orderings which satisfies (U), (SP) and (I) must use suitable lexicographic oligarchies as tie-breakers. where R = F({W i }).
Proof. Suppose F is a SWFL generating quasi-transitive social orderings satisfying (ONC+0), (U), (I) and (SP). Let (δ 1 , δ 2 , ..., δ n )∈{-1, 0, 1} n be given.
In analogy to our proof of thereom 3.2., step (1) will be to use F to construct a SWFL, G :
→ set of quasi-transitive social orderings, that satisfies the conditions of theorem 2.7.. In step (2), we will apply theorem 2.7. to determine the structure of G; in step (3), we will again infer the structure of F from the structure of G.
( where R = G({W i }).
(2) Partition N into T 1 , T 2 , ..., T k+1 as follows: for each i∈{1, 2, ..., k}, T i = {i j : j∈S i }, and T k+1 = {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j n-m }.
We will now show that, for any {W i }∈W n and any 
Given a SWFL generating quasi-transitive social orderings which satisfies (ONC+0), (U), (SP) and (I), theorem 3.5. states that whenever the same persons are above, on, and below the 'zero-line' under both x 1 and x 2 --formally sign(W i (x 1 )) = sign(W i (x 2 )) = δ i for each i∈N and a fixed (δ 1 , δ 2 , ..., δ n ) ∈ {-1, 0, 1} n --the relative ranking of x 1 and x 2 is determined by a lexicographic oligarchy. Again, if we use (P) instead of (SP), small modifications in the proof of theorem 3.5. are sufficient to establish that an oligarchy as defined in condition (O) must determine the relative ranking of x 1 and x 2 .
Now it is easy to see that, if we impose condition (A), the ties covered by theorem 3.5. must always be broken by an oligarchy consisting of the whole of N (i.e. the tie-breaking lexicographic oligarchy is defined by partitioning N into the singleton partition S 1 = N). The following result follows immediately from this observation: PROPOSITION 3.6. Suppose F is a SWFL generating quasi-transitive social orderings which satisfies (ONC+0), (U), (I), (SP) and (A). Then, for each (δ 1 , δ 2 , ..., δ n )∈{-1, 0, 1} Note that condition (A) is crucial to this result, because the SWFL of theorem 3.1. satisfies all of (ONC+0), (U), (P), (I) and (D) as well as (PR), and certainly generates quasi-transitive social orderings (by virtue of generating transitive ones).
Conclusion
We have seen that, even in the narrow informational framework of ordinal measurability without interpersonal comparability of welfare levels or units, the introduction of a 'zero-line' of welfare points towards an escape-route from Arrow's impossibility theorem, though a limited one. In particular, we are in a position to draw the following conclusions:
(i) Different versions of the 'head-count' rule satisfy Arrow's conditions under the informational framework of (ONC+0).
(ii) If we require social orderings to be transitive, none of these rules satisfies anonymity, and, for an important class of ties, the only way of breaking these ties in accordance with Arrow's conditions is by installing a suitable (lexicographic) dictatorship, which can, however, vary depending on the number of people below, on, or above the 'zeroline'.
(iii) If we only require social orderings to be quasi-transitive, there are rules satisfying anonymity. Irrespective of whether or not we demand anonymity, the only way of breaking an important class of ties is by installing a suitable (lexicographic) oligarchy, which can again vary depending on the number of people below, on, or above the 'zero-line'. If we insist on anonymity, however, Pareto-incomparable alternatives
